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: Category No. 13B 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case involves a boundary dispute in a rural area west 
of Springville, Utah. The plaintiff, Clair W. and Gladys Judd 
Family Limited Partnership (hereinafter the ffJuddsf!), filed a 
Complaint against Bernell L. Hutchings, Mrs. Bernell Hutchings, 
Ronald J. Sherman and Mrs. Ronald J. Sherman (hereinafter 
"Hutchings") seeking to quiet title, to locate the fence line and 
to obtain damages (R. 1-3). The Hutchings counter-claimed 
seeking to quiet title in their name up to the present fence line 
(R. 12-15). At trial, on September 5, 1985, the Judds sought to 
quiet title on the deed line set forth by the description on 
their deed, while the Hutchings sought to quiet title on the 
existing fence line. 
At the beginning of the trial, counsel filed a stipulation 
of the issues with an attached copy of the survey which the 
parties agreed was accurate (R. 43-46). The stipulation states 
that a survey was performed by a Donald C. Cole, based upon both 
the Hutching's and J Jdfs deeds and that the only boundary in 
1 
dispute is the southern Hutching's boundary and the Judd's 
northern boundary. Paragraph 4 of the Stipulation describes 
three lines which the trial court could establish as the proper 
boundary between the Juddfs and Hutching's property. Those lines 
were set forth in the survey and described in the Stipulation as: 
A. Point "A" to Point "B" in black is the present 
fenceline. 
B. Point "C" to Point "D" designated in red, is the 
Hutching's deed line. 
C. Point "E" to Point "F", in yellow is the Judd 
deed line. 
The Stipulation further listed three issues which were 
before the court. Those three issues are contained in Paragraphs 
5, 6 and 7 of the Stipulation and read as follows: 
5. The issue before the Court and to be resolved by 
the court is the question, what is the proper 
boundary between the plaintiff's and the defendant's 
property, that is, should it be at the present fence 
line designated in black, Point "A" to Point "B", 
should it be the Hutching's deed line, designated 
as Point "C" to Point "D" in red, or whether it 
should be the Judd deed line, designated in yellow 
from Point "E" to Point "F". 
6. A further issue to be resolved by the Court is 
in the event the court determines that the correct 
boundary line is not the current fence line, who 
pays for the expense of moving the fence to its 
correct location? 
7. The last issue to be determined by the court 
is what, if any, damages have the plaintiffs 
suffered in respect to the disputed boundary line? 
The trial court held for the defendant Hutchings and ruled 
on the basis of the doctrine of boundary of acquiescence, thus 
placing the boundary on the fence line (R. 86-89). 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgement 
were signed on January 23 1986 (R. 102-109) and the Judds filed 
their notice of appeal on February 21, 1986 (R. 114). 
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Plaintiff—Appellants property (the Judd property) is 
adjacent to the Hutching's property which was owned by 
defendants—respondents the Hutching's and subsequently sold to 
the defendants—respondents the Shermans. The Judd's deed 
description is traced from an 1883 patent (R. 137, 141). The 
Hutchingfs deed description is traced from an 1884 patent (R. 
137). The deed descriptions have overlapped from 1884 until the 
present (R. 137). 
The two properties were held by various predecessors of the 
parties until Willis E. Strong and his wife Elizabeth Irene 
Strong acquired both properties and held them simultaneously. (R. 
142, 147). On March 3, 1937, the Strongs conveyed the Hutchings 
property to Fay Johnson, a predecessor to the Hutchings, using 
the same description as used in the 1884 patent. The Strongs 
subsequently conveyed the Judd property on March 16, 1942 to A. 
Leroy and Lucille B. Erickson, predecessors of the Judds, using 
the same description as in the 1883 patent. Clair W. and Gladys 
Judd purchased the Judd property in 1952 and subsequently 
transferred it to Plaintiff—Appellant, the Judd Family Limited 
Partnership (R. 150). The deed description transferring the 
Judd property to the Judds in 1952 was erroneous in that it did 
not state the description's point of beginning (R. 140). 
Hutchings purchased their property in 1981 and subsequently sold 
it to the Shermans in 1983 (R. 204). 
The difficulties in this case arise because the south 
boundary of the Hutchings deed overlaps the north boundary of the 
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Judds deed by approximately 22 feet. (R. 46). The fence line, 
which the district court quieted title in the Hutchings, lies 
approximately 34 feet south of the southern boundary as indicated 
in the Hutchingfs deed (R. 46). 
When the Judds purchased the property in 1952, they believed 
the fence line was on the boundary (R. 151, 170). It was not 
until the Hutchings attempted to obtain a Quit Claim Deed from 
the Judds that the Judds became aware of the discrepancy (R. 150-
151; 172-174). The Judds and Hutchings and their respective 
predecessors believed the fence line to be the boundary between 
the two properties (R. 151, 161-163, 170-173, 215, 222-223 257-
259). At all times since the Judd property was deeded out in 
1942, the Judds and their predecessors have occupied the land 
south of the fence, (R. 162-163, 170 154-156, 193) and the 
Hutchings and their predecessors have occupied the land north of 
the fence (R. 222-223 228, 252-254). 
The fence was constructed in about 1942 by Mr. Wayne York, a 
predecessor of the Hutchings and was placed on the property line 
as determined by a survey conducted at that time (R. 229-232). 
The fence has remained in substantially the same location since 
construction despite repairs and partial replacement in 1958 and 
again in 1977 or 1978 (R. 155, 159, 162 178 188, 205, 214-215, 
243-244, 247-248, 255-260, 262-263, 276-277). In addition to the 
fence the Judds also built a barn on the "north side of ray 
property, abutting the Hutchings property fairly close to the 
fence line" (R. 162), Dr. Judd also testified that a shed was 
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built on the north side of the property abutting the fence but 
the shed was blown down and all that remained was the cement 
foundation (R. 163-164). There was also a cement ditch which 
replaced a dirt ditch abutting the fence separating the 
properties (R. 213-214, 256-260). 
By measuring from the fence line to the south fenceline of 
the Judd property, all but about seven feet of the north-south 
distance deeded in the Judd description is included in the Judd 
fencelines even though the north fence is approximately 54 feet 
south of the north deed line (R. 145-146). The Judds also gave a 
Warranty Deed to the State Road Coraission in 1965 for property 
south of their current southern fenceline and entirely outside 
the area included in the Judd deed description (R. 269-273). 
The trial court quieted title in the Hutchings up to the 
fence line based on the doctrine of boundary of acquiescence. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issue of boundary by acquiescence was properly before 
the court as indicated in the Stipulation presented at trial. 
That stipulation stated that the issue before the court was to 
quiet title to the parties using the north boundary on the JuddTs 
deed, the south boundary of the Hutchingfs deed or the fence line 
as the boundary for quieting title. This left the door open to 
the district court to invoke the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence if all the elements of that doctrine had been met. 
The elements of boundary by acquiescence are, as stated in 
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£2iL!i22ZL~Z±-£££2E2i25* 6 9 ° p # 2 d 5 3 5 , a t 5 3 8 ( u t a h 1984): 
(1) Occupation up to a visible line marked by 
monuments, fences or buildings, 
(2) Mutual acquiescence in the line as a 
boundary, 
(3) For a long period of time, 
(4) By adjoining landowners, 
(5) With evidence of dispute or uncertainty as 
to the true boundary line measured against an 
objective test. 
The parties and their predecessors have occupied their 
respective sides of the fence which was considered as a boundary. 
The boundary is also marked by construction of the barn and shed 
and cement ditch abutting the fence. The parties and their 
predecessors acquiesced in the fence line as a boundary by 
keeping their horses and cattle on their respective sides of the 
fence. This acquiescence in the fence line as a boundary existed 
from the time the fence was constructed in 1942 until this 
dispute arose in 1983. It is undisputed that these are adjoining 
landowners. The objective uncertainty as to the true boundary 
line is met by the Judd deed's overlap on the north end with the 
south end of the property described in Hutchingfs deed. One 
possible cause of this overlap is that the Judd Deed does not 
contain a point of beginning. Another factor indicating 
objectively measurable uncertainty is that the fence line was 
originally constructed on a line staked out as the boundary of 
the property pursuant to a survey conducted in about 1942. In 
consideration of these elements, the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence was properly invoked by the district court in this 
case. 
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The district court properly excluded hearsay evidence 
proffered by the Judds. That proffered evidence was testimony 
about a conversation between Dr. Judd and Mr. Roger Judd with Mr. 
Liechty, a predecessor in interest to the Hutching's property. 
The testimony indicated that Mr. Liechty, now deceased, did not 
believe the fence was on the boundary line but was south of the 
proper boundary. There is no exception to the hearsay rule in 
the Utah Rules of Evidence which was cited at trial or in the 
appellantfs brief which would allow hearsay testimony of a 
predecessor in interestfs state of mind regarding the property 
boundary. In Stratford^v^JMorgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984), this 
court stated that "no element of boundary by acquiescence could 
be proved by evidence as to state of mind." This Court therefore 
held that such evidence "was unquestionably hearsay and thus 
inadmissable." 
In the event that boundary by acquiescence was improperly 
implied by the trial court, priority of title rests with the 
Hutchings and the title should be quieted in the Hutchings up to 
the south deed line of the Hutchings property. Although the Judd 
deed description originated in an 1883 patent and the Hutchings 
property description originated in an 1884 patent, the two 
properties merged into the single and simultaneous ownership of 
Willis E. Strong. After merger, the first property deeded out 
from the common grantor takes priority, G^S^vald^^v^^Camano 
SiH5£2i£i^2lSiS£^^S25£22Z> 81 p , 2 d 8 2 6 (Wash. 1938). Since the 
Hatchings property was deeded out from the common grantor, Willis 
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Strong, prior to the Judd property, the Hutchings deed has 
priority over the Judd deed. If boundary by acquiescence is not 
applicable, title should be quieted in the parties up to the 
Hutchings1 southern deed line. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ISSUE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE WAS PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. 
The stipulation attached as an addendum to the appellantfs 
brief and also found in the record (R. 43-46), was offered at 
trial as a stipulation to the accuracy of the survey, an outline 
of the land subject to dispute, and the issues at trial. 
Paragraph 4 of the stipulation describes three lines shown on the 
survey which the district court could have used as the boundary 
in order to quiet title in the parties. Those three lines as 
marked on the survey (R. 46) are described as follows: 
A. Point "A" to Point "B" in black as the present 
fence line. 
B. Point "C" to Point "D" designated in red, is 
the Hutchings deed line. 
C. Point "E" to Point "F" in yellow, is the Judd's 
deed line (R. 44). 
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the stipulation indicate the boundary 
issues which were before the court. Those paragraphs read: 
5. The issue before the court and to be resolved 
by the court is the question, what is the proper 
boundary between the plaintiffs and defendants 
property, that is, should it be at the present 
£S n£ e~^ i n~~ d e s i g n a t e d i n bJ-acK* Point "A" to 
PoInF^IT1^*"should it be the Hutchings deed line, 
designated as Point flCff to Point "D" in red, or 
whether it should be the Judd deed line, designated 
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in yellow, from Point "E" to Point "F". 
6. A further issue to be resolved by the court is 
in the event the court determines that the correct 
boundary lin^is^not^at^the current £5,555 >ii5e> w h o 
p ay s^Tor^the^expense^oT"' movIng^the^Tence^o^I'ts 
correct location? (Emphasis added.) R. 44. 
This statement of the primary issues at trial demonstrates 
that the parties recognized that the fence line was a boundary 
which the court could use to quiet title to the disputed property 
in the parties. Under these circumstances, the court could 
properly invoke any doctrine in which the elements have been met 
to quiet title to the property in the parties using the fence 
line as a boundary. Therefore the court did not err in quieting 
title in the disputed property up to the existing fence line 
under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
POINT II 
THE ELEMENTS OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE HAVE 
BEEN MET. 
I n
 £S55255^^^i}^5£525> 6 9° p* 2 d 535 (Utah 1984), this Court 
stated that: 
In order to establish a boundary line by 
acquiescence, there must be evidence of (1) 
occupation up to a visible line marked by 
monuments, fences or buildings, (2) mutual 
acquiescence in the line as a boundary 
(3) for a long period of time, (4) by ad-
joining landowners. In addition, there 
must be (5) evidence of dispute or uncer-
tainty as to the true boundary line 
measured against an objective test. Id at 
538-539. 
(1) Occupation Up To A Visible Line Marked by Monuments, 
Fences or Buildings. 
The fence was constructed in about 1942, along a survey of 
the Hutchings property, by Mr. Wayne York (R. 229-232) and all 
9 
the subsequent owners of the Hutchings and Judd properties 
treated the fenceline as the boundary (R. 151 161-163 170-173, 
215, 222-223, 257-259). The fence has remained in substantially 
the same location since construction despite repairs or partial 
replacement in 1958 and again in 1977 or 1978 (R. 155 159 162 
178, 188 205, 214-215, 243-244 247-248, 255-260, 262-263, 276-
277). 
In addition to the fence line, the Judds built a barn and 
shed on the north end of their property (R. 162-164). There is 
also a cement ditch north of and abutting the fence (R. 213-214, 
256-260), The fence line, barn, shed (only the foundation 
remains) and ditch are all built along the line which has been 
considered the property boundary for years. These markers 
constitute the "visible line marked by monuments, fences, or 
buildings" as referred to in Parsons. 
Another indication that the fence line was considered the 
boundary, is that the fence encircling the Judd property, as 
measured from north to south, includes all but about seven feet 
of the north/south distance in the Judd deed (R. 145-146). This 
is so despite the fact that the Judd deed line is approximately 
54 feet north of the fence line. Furthermore, in 1965 Dr. Judd 
gave a Warranty Deed to the State Road Commission of a strip of 
land south of the southern fenceline of the Judd property (R. 
269). this property was entirely outside the area included in 
the Judd deed description (R. 272-273). This further indicates 
that the J'*ddfs believed tht the northern fencelilne was the 
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boundary between the Hutchings and Judd properties. 
Paragraph 1 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered by the district court states "the court finds that the 
evidence is undisputed that the parties occupied their respective 
parcels of land up to a visible line marked by the fence" (R. 
102-103). In consideration of the above facts, the trial court 
properly found that this element of boundary by acquiescence has 
been met. 
(2) Mutual Acquiescence In The Fence Line As A Boundary. 
Paragraph 2 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
states "the court finds that the evidence established the 
parties' acquiescence in recognizing the fence line as the 
boundary. At the very least this is established by fact that 
neither party attempted to occupy the property opposite the fence 
line from their own parcel of land" (R. 103). 
*
n
 £S£S2£}S, this Court held that the parties had not 
acquiesced in the fence line as a boundary when Parsons had 
occupied the disputed land, tore down a significant portion of 
the fence, used the land to store firewood, and planted trees, 
shrubs and other plants thereon. Parsons also immediately 
objected when Anderson attempted to clear shrubs and build on the 
strip of land on the disputed property. 
In the instant case, there was no occupation of the disputed 
land by the Judds. In fact, the evidence indicates that the 
Judds and predecessors believed the fence line was on the 
boundary. Mr. Judd testified that he believed the fence line was 
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the boundary when he purchased the property (R. 151). He also 
indicated that he built a barn and a shed adjacent to the fence 
"on the north side of my property abutting the Hutchings 
property" (R. 162-163). Testimony of Raphel C. Palfreyman also 
indicated that Dr. Judd did not believe the property north of the 
fence was his. Mr. Palfreyman was leasing the Hutchings property 
at the time Dr. Judd wanted to line the dirt ditch north of and 
adjacent to the fence with concrete. At that time, Dr. Judd 
requested permission from Mr. Palfreyman, as lessor of the 
property, to line the ditch with cement (R. 257-260). Based on 
these facts and others in the trial transcript, the trial court 
was correct in finding that the parties had mutually acquiesced 
in the fence line as a boundary. 
(3) For A Long Period of Time. 
In Hobson v^PangujLtch^Lake 530 P. 2d 792 (Utah 
1975), this Court held that only under unusual circumstances 
would any period less than 20 years be sufficient to establish 
boundary by acquiescence. In this case, the fence was 
constructed along a survey of the boundary line in approximately 
1942 by Mr. Wayne York, one of the Hutchings predecessors (R. 
229-232). Although the fence has been repaired or segments 
replaced over the years, the fence is substantially in the same 
location as it was in 1942. The district court stated in the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Paragraph 3 that "the 
court finds the fence has been in its present position, with only 
minor alterations for reasons immaterial to this decision, for a 
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sufficient period of time. The evidence is clear that the fence 
has existed in substantially the position indicated by the 
survey, Exhibit #4, for at least 20 years as required by Hobson 
Ij:-£2£Siiii£!i^ t2!S5-.£2££2I2ii2Ii» 5^0 P.2d 795 (Utah 1975), and that 
it very likely has existed in its current position for over 40 
years (R. 103)• The trial transcript is filled with testimony 
that the fence line has existed in substantially the same 
position indicated by the survey for many years (R. 155, 159, 162 
178, 188, 205, 214-215, 243-244, 247-248, 255-260, 262-263, 276-
277)• Based on the testimony at trial, the trial court properly 
found that the fence was deemed a property boundary by adjoining 
land owners for a long period of time. 
(4) By Adjoining Landowners. 
The trial court stated in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in Paragraph 4 that "the court finds that 
there is no dispute that the parties are adjoining landowners or 
that their predecessors have occupied the parcels of land up to 
the fence for over 40 years" (R. 103). There is no dispute as 
to this element of boundary by acquiescence at the trial. 
Therefore the trial court properly found that this element of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence was met. 
(5) Evidence of Dispute or Uncertainty As To The True 
Boundary Line Measured Against an Objective Test. 
This Court in Hallada^v^Cluf f^  685 P. 2d 500 (Utah 1984), 
indicated that boundary by acquiescence contests are typically 
between two competing policy interests. First, the desire to 
13 
conform the boundaries that have been recognized on the ground 
over a long period of time and, second, the desire to enhance 
reliance on the property dimensions shown in the county records. 
Id at 504. 
In order to best satisfy the policy behind these interests, 
this court added the additional element of an objectively 
measurable uncertainty to the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence. This court held: 
Under the rules as we have defined it here, 
the property line shown on the title cannot 
be displaced by another boundary unless it 
is shown that during the period of acquie-
scence there was some objectively measurable 
circumstance in the record title or in the 
reasonably available survey information (or 
other technique which record title infor-
mation was located on the ground) that would 
have prevented a landowner, as a practical 
matter, from being reasonably certain about 
the true location of the boundary. Id. at 
505. 
This additional element did not eliminate the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. In fact, the Court said, "boundary by 
acquiescence remains a viable means of establishing a boundary 
where there is objective uncertainty in the location of the true 
boundary that could not reasonably be resolved by reference to 
the record title and by use of reasonably available survey 
information." JcK The Court then listed some examples of 
objectively measurable uncertainty. Two of the examples apply to 
this case. The first of those two examples are "disagreements 
among different surveyors on location of the boundary line." JcK 
at 506. In the instant case Mr. Wayne York constructed the fence 
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on what he believed was the property line as established by 
survey which occurred in about 1942 (R. 229-232). The 1942 
survey placed the boundary line of the Hutchings property (the 
current fence line) approximately 34 feet south of the Hutchings 
deed line. Further evidence that the parties relied on the 
original survey as a boundary is that the distance included in 
the Judd fence line, as measured from north to south, is only 
about seven feet less than the north-south distance in the Judd 
deed (R. 145-146). In addition, Dr. Judd gave a warranty deed to 
the State road Commission in 1965 to property south of the 
southern Judd fenceline which was entirely outside the Judd deed 
description (R. 269-273). These acts by Dr. Judd indicate his 
reliance on the surveyed fence line as a boundary. The current 
survey revealed this discrepancy and this dispute arose as a 
result of the discrepancy revealed in the second survey. 
The other example of objectively measurable uncertainty 
referred to in Hallada^ which is applicable in this case is the 
"uncertainty or dispute created by conflicting terms in deeds 
such as overlapping descriptions." Id. The survey which was 
attached as part of the Stipulation (R. 43-46) was stipulated as 
accurate by the parties. That survey reveals that the northern 
boundary of the Judd deed overlaps the southern boundary of the 
Hutchings deed by approximately 22 feet. This overlapping meets 
the objectively measurable uncertainty test as required under 
In light of the foregoing discussion, the elements of the 
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doctrine of boundary by acquiescence have been met and therefore 
the trial court properly invoked that doctrine in order to quiet 
title in the disputed property up to the fence line. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED HEARSAY TESTIMONY 
PROFFERED BY THE PLAINTIFF'S REGARDING THE STATE OF 
MIND OF THE HUTCHINGS1 PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST. 
Proffered testimony by Dr. Judd and Mr. Roger Judd regarding 
statements made to them by the late Brigham J. Liechty, a 
predecessor in interest of the Hutchings were properly excluded 
by the trial court as hearsay. Those statements would have 
indicated the state of mind of Mr. Liechty regarding his belief 
that the fence was not on the boundary line (R. 283-284). 
Appellants were unable to cite either at trial or in their brief 
any exception to the hearsay rules in the Utah Rules of Evidence 
or any Utah case law substantiating their position that the 
hearsay testimony should be admitted under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. The case law cited by appellants all predates the 
adoption of the Utah Rules of Evidence and therefore is not 
applicable absent an exception under the rules. 
I n
 51 rat for d^ v^ .^  Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984), this Court 
affirmed the district court's exclusion of hearsay evidence in a 
boundary by acquiescence case. That evidence included a title 
opinion, correspondence with a party in Salt Lake County, and 
testimony of a predecessor in interest. In that case, the 
excluded evidence was offered to establish the state of mind of 
the Stratfords at the time they erected the fence. This Court 
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affirmed the exclusion of the testimony because the mental state 
of the Stratfords was not an issue in the case. The Court 
stated: "No element of boundary by acquiescence could be proved 
by evidence as to state of mind." (Jd. at 364). In the instant 
case, the testimony was proffered by the appellants to prove the 
state of mind of the declarant and was inadmissible hearsay. 
Even if the hearsay evidence were admissible, the exclusion 
of that evidence would not be prejudicial error. The evidence 
proffered was a conversation between Dr. Judd and the decedent as 
well as Mr. Roger Judd (Dr. Juddfs son) and the decedent. 
Because the two persons who would have testified were parties 
closely related to the appellant, the district court would have 
given this testimony less weight than if they were unrelated to 
the party at trial. On the other hand, the greater weight of the 
evidence demonstrates that statements were not made or it was not 
common knowledge that the fence line was not on the proper 
boundary line. Dr. Judd's statements that the barn and shed were 
constructed on the north end of his property abutting the fence 
(R. 162-163) and his request for permission from Raphel 
Palfreyman to line the ditch just north of the fence with cement 
(R. 257-258) indicates Dr. Judd's belief that the fence line 
coincided with the property line and that any statements by Mr. 
Liechty to the contrary were disregarded. 
The Hutchings in a rebuttal proffer, proffered testimony 
from Victor J. Liechtyfs deposition. Victor J. Liechty is the 
son of Brigham J. Liechty, the decedent whose hearsay testimony 
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was being proffered. In the rebuttal proffer, Mr. Liechty 
indicated that he had never heard his father indicate that the 
fence line and the boundary did not agree (R. 284-285). Because 
the weight of the evidence would support the district court's 
findings, even after admitting the hearsay testimony, the trial 
court did not commit prejudicial error in excluding the hearsay 
testimony. 
POINT IV 
PRIORITY OF TITLE IS FOUND IN THE HUTCHING'S DEED. 
If this court finds that boundary by acquiescence was not 
properly applied by the district court, then title should be 
quieted in the parties based on either the Judd deed line or the 
Hutchings deed line. 
The undisputed testimony of Glen C -istensen, of Provo Land 
Title Company, revealed that the Judd property was deeded out of 
a U.S. and patent in 1883 and that the Hutchings property was 
also deeded out of a land patent in 1884 (R. 135-137). His 
testimony was based upon computer plotted maps from the Utah 
County Plat Department and on record titles (R. 138). The 
overlap in descriptions was created at the time of the patent and 
has existed thereafter. 
Mr. Christensen further testified that a Mr. Willis Strong 
was subsequently the owner of both parcels of ground (R. 142). 
He deeded out both parcel ^f ground using the same legal 
description that came from the patent. He deeded out the 
Hutchings property prior to deeding out the Plaintiff's property 
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(R. 143-144). Even though the Judd deed description was created 
prior to the Hutchings deed description, those two descriptions 
merged in Mr. Willis Strong when he acquired and simultaneously 
held both parcels of ground. 
In
 ££2£5S^2JLSL-.Y^~£.§2^ » ^ 1 P. 2d 
826 (Wash. 1938), the parties respective predecessors were each 
deeded property under a patent at different times. Subsequently 
the parties realized that the deeds of their adjoining land 
overlapped. In that case there was no subsequent ownership by a 
common grantor other than the original patentor, the U. S. 
government. The court in that case held that the parties deed 
which was first patented had priority. The Court, quoting Corpus 
Juris stated a rule of law. It said "where there is a clash of 
boundaries in two deeds from the same grantor, the title of the 
grantee in the deed first executed is, to the extent of the 
conflict, superior; and the^£ule^a££li.es^ 
Si2i2^2S^i2^£2S^S22££5S^5X^22^^i5^i^i5ii22•" (EmPhasis added) Id. 
at 829. 
In the instant case, the original patent of the Judd 
property would control if the property had not been held by a 
common grantor, Willis Strong. At the time Willis Strong held 
both parcels simultaneously, the titles merged into a common 
owner. At the time Willis Strong granted the Hutchings property 
to Fay Johnson, he conveyed to her all of the area described in 
that deed. The description was the same description as used in 
the 1884 patent. Mr. Strong retained ownership of the property 
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described in the 1883 patent less that overlapping property which 
he conveyed to Fay Johnson, When Mr. Strong subsequently 
conveyed the Judd property to the Juddfs predecessors in 
interest, he no longer retained ownership of the area of the 
overlap and therefore could not covey it. Therefore, the 
Hutchings deed is the first deed from the same grantor. As 
stated in the rule of law mentioned above, the title of the 
grantee in the deed first executed is, to the extent of the 
conflict, superior. 
Therefore if the trial court improperly applied the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence, the Hatchings deed description has 
priority and title should be quieted in the parties using the 
Hutchings deed line as a boundary. 
CONCLUSION 
The parties properly stipulated to the issues at trial. 
Those issues incl' ded boundary by acquiescence because the 
parties stipulated that the trial court could use the Judd deed 
line, the Hutchings deed line, or the fence line as a proper 
boundary in which title to the disputed property could be 
quieted. 
The trial court properly invoked the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence because the parties and their predecessors, as 
adjoining land owners, had occupied their respective properties 
to the fence and had mutually acquiesced in the fence line as a 
boundary for a period well in excess of 20 years. In addition, 
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there was an objectively measurable uncertainty in the true 
boundary line measured by two objective tests. The first test 
was met when the 1942 and 1983 surveys conflicted. The 1942 
survey staked out the southern boundary of the Hutchings 
property. The fence was subsequently built along the boundary as 
staked out by the survey. In 1983 the survey placed the southern 
boundary of the Hutchings property approximately 34 feet north of 
the fence, thereby creating an objectively measurable uncertainty 
as to the true location of the boundary. 
The second indication of an objectively measurable 
uncertainty as to the true boundary line is indicated by the 
overlap by approximately 22 feet of the southern boundary as 
described in the Hutchings deed with the northern boundary as 
described in the Judd deed. 
Because each of the elements of boundary by acquiescence has 
been met, the district court properly applied that doctrine and 
by using the fence line as a boundary by which title to the 
disputed property is quieted in the Hutchings. 
The district court properly excluded hearsay evidence 
regarding the state of mind of a predecessor in interest to the 
Hutchings property regarding the true location of the property. 
Because the state of mind of the deceased predecessor in interest 
was not an issue in the case, hearsay testimony regarding that 
state of mind is inadmissible unless an exception to the hearsay 
rule as found in the Utah Rules of Evidence, permits 
admissibility of the hearsay. 
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Even if the hearsay evidence had been admissible the trial 
court did not commit prejudicial error by excluding the evidence 
because the greater weight of the evidence at trial indicates 
that the parties and their predecessors had acquiesced in the 
fence line as a boundary between their respective properties. 
If the trial court improperly invoked the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence, the Hutchings deed was the first deed 
issued by a common grantor, Willis Strong, and therefore has 
priority. In that event, the trial court should have quieted 
title to the disputed property using the Hutchings deed line as 
the boundary. 
Respectively submitted this M day of October, 1986. 
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